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Abstract. The question whether I am the same person at different moments has brought 
many difficulties for a long time. The problem with identity of things through time was 
already known in the ancient times especially when Plutarch asked whether a ship of 
Theseus with exchanged elements is still the same ship as before renovation. Today, we 
continue these considerations asking, for instance, if things, apart from their physical 
parts, also have temporal parts. The number of the proposed solutions to the problem of 
identity and identity of persons at different times resembles wandering in a dark room 
with a scarf on your eyes. As a result, rather than coming closer to the light switch, we 
find concepts which suggest that personal identity is not important, or what is import-
ant is psychological continuity or identity which is only a matter of degree. So I can be 
the same person as I was in some part, in some degree. It sounds like a constitution 
person who likes darkness and does not need light anymore. Unfortunately, first of all, 
we still use successfully the concept of identity in an ordinary language, and what is 
more, the abandonment of the notion of personal identity results in a greater number 
of absurdities, so in consequence, we still do not have an idea how to treat personal 
identity.
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Main points 
In this article two mental experiments will be presented. The experiments 
were designed to sharpen two criteria of personal identity from the group 
of complex view, that is, the continuity of the body and the psychological 
continuity. The examination of these experiments will be conducted relying 
on the assumption that the continuity of the body and the psychological 
continuity are not sufficient, as the criteria of personal identity. These two 
criteria, the continuity of the body and psychological continuity (considered 
as the sum) can be examined only as a certificate of personal identity.1 
The second aspect: I accept that the soul is the basic element of personal 
identity, on the one hand, understood as Swinburne does, and on the other, 
as ability to first-person perspective.2
At the beginning I would like to underline that in this article I will not 
refer so much to the proposal of Lynne Ruder Baker, not-so-simple simple 
view (Baker 2012, 179–191). I will refer to her only in case of understanding 
that the basis of personal identity is the human ability to first-person 
perspective which, in my point of view, is located in the soul. However, 
using the proposition of Swinburne, I recognize that the human soul is the 
principle of personal identity and may be the subject of further analysis, in 
terms of both functional as well as ontological status.3 Nevertheless, I accept 
that its ontological status is still a challenge and the weakest point in the 
discussion of the soul.
1 According to the view expressed by R. Swinburne. (Swinburne 2001, 329–345). 
2 However, proposed solutions do not sound original, so my aim is not to be so original as 
to try to connect this what we know about personal identity and present the view that we 
can somehow still hold conceptions using the existence of the soul in time when all data 
are trying to prove that there is nothing more than physics and brains. On the other hand, 
maintaining that the soul is a source of first-person perspective requires the rethinking 
of the notion of Lynne Ruder Baker on not-so-simple view concept and her other works. 
(See: Baker 2000; Baker 2012; Baker 2013).
3 For example, by the negative statement that it is something non-material, different from 
the body, which is non-destructive with the death of a person.
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1. Two questions
Basically, the discussion devoted to looking for a necessary and sufficient 
criterion of personal identity is reduced to two fundamental questions: 
1) what does it mean, that the person O2 in the moment t2 is the same person 
as the person O1 in the moment t1 and 2) How do we know that a person O2 
at the time t2 is the same person, as O1 at time t1? (Swinburne 2001, 200; 
Noonan 2003). These two questions we can supplemented by an auxiliary 
question, which can also be treated as a starting point in the discussion if 
criteria of personal identity must be physical.4 We cannot forget that the 
distinction between two questions about identity in terms of synchronic 
and diachronic approach, should not be considered as appearing in “two 
separate versions: diachronic and synchronic. There are rather two kinds of 
situations that raise questions of identity and diversity entities, including 
the people” (Bremer 2007, 28). It follows that studies concerning exploring 
necessary and sufficient conditions of the criterion of personal identity can 
also start with asking what makes it that I am this but not other person, 
or, what kind of feature or property distinguishes me from all other things. 
(Ayer 1965, 225–239).
1.1. The principle of identity
The term relevant to the topic of principles – principles of identity (iden-
tity), comes from G.W. Leibniz, who states that “every object is identical 
with itself” and, secondly, “nothing is identical with its opposite.” “These 
statements should be supplemented by Leibniz Identification Principle: 
there can be many substances, which are no different from each other. The 
substances are identical qualitatively indistinguishable” (Bremer 2007, 
28). The contribution of Leibniz can be extended by another statement 
formulating the principle of identity; in accordance with the principle of the 
4 Ayer’s question can be considered equally relevant because it broadens the perspective 
of research on the criteria of personal identity, and in this situation requires deeper 
analysis of the physical criteria used frequently because of the useful qualities. (Ayer 
1965, 239–254).
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syntactic – A = A “no matter what the A is, where (i) x = x is proven logically 
for all x, or where (ii) p is materially equivalent with p (p = p, regardless p) 
it is proved in all p. 5 (Bremer 2007, 28). Therefore, identity and personal 
identity need to be understood in a way that there is no other object which 
the object A would be the same with, but only with itself. Secondly, at the 
time t1 the object A as well as at time t2 object B are the same objects.
1.2. The criteria of personal identity 
Usually, it is argued that personal identity is either something original, 
simple, irreducible to any other criteria6 or personal identity depends on the 
continuity of the body, psychological continuity, e.g. continuity of memory, 
character and mental states.7 In addition, in case of the second group at least 
more can be mentioned, or where it is said that personal identity depends 
on factors available in the empirical perception or reduction is required, 
namely a reference to e.g. a non-physical being. Having in mind that the 
purpose of research on personal identity is to find a criterion which will be 
compliant with the necessary and sufficient condition, following Grygianiec 
we can distinguish the following positions which will be discussed in the 
remaining part of the work (Grygianiec 2007, 123–128):
5 Bremer in his discussion on the principle of identity and reference to its various types 
mentions M. Heidegger. Heidegger, following Bremer, maintains that the sentence about 
identity says something more than just that each thing is identical with itself. “Syntactic 
A = A says nothing about the sense of identity, which does not consist in the fact that 
each object is the same, but the fact that each of the same objects is the same to itself, 
which means that each sentence about identity expresses some mediation or synthesis. 
The sentence of identity is therefore not equal with two terms or the empty identity of 
each object, but a kind of mediation. In this way, it is not only the basic principle of think-
ing, but the principle of being. Something that could be the same, just one thing, you do 
not need two as the equality. Thus identity appears as one of the current problems in the 
mediation. Understanding presented by Heidegger is compliant with identity referred to 
the person (the person themselves is the same).” (Bremer 2007, 28–29).
6 The group of these answers is called the Simple View and it starts with Thomas Rieda and 
Josepha Butler.
7 The group of these answers is known as the Complex View and it starts with D. Hume and 
J. Locke
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(A) physical positions:
a. The identity of persons relies on identity of their bodies;
b. The identity of persons relies on the physical continuity of their 
bodies;
c. The identity of the person relies on identity of living organisms;
d. The identity of persons relies on the identity or continuity of their 
brains;
(B) Psychological positions:
a. The identity of persons relies on identity of their memory or part of 
the memory;
b. The identity of persons relies on their psychological continuity.
(C) Dualistic positions: the identity of persons is identity of their souls 
(D) Simplistic position: the identity of persons is irreducible to other kind 
of relations, facts.
2. Vagaries of personal identity
We can imagine ourselves, citing a well-known thought-through experiment 
prepared by Derek Parfit, that a person wins a space trip from planet X to 
planet Y8. Spaceflights are completely different than today as we could have 
expected, because we do not need any complicated spacecraft, we need to 
use only the teletransporter cabin. The teletransporter’s function lies in 
the fact that when there is a person in the cabin, their body, including the 
brain, and all data, and memories are rapidly scanned and next completely 
destroyed. On the other hand, based on scanned information, including 
information even on the state of the smallest cell in a matter of seconds, the 
person is recreated on planet Y. Excellence of teletransporter is expressed 
even in the fact that when I am standing on planet X, thinking that it is 
snowing outside, I – who will be recreated on planet Y – will be thinking 
8 The experiments with teletransportation and transfer of brain are chosen because of 
the attention coming from thought experiment and personal identity, (Coleman 2000, 
53–69). Coleman observes that the text related to personal identity, which would not take 
into consideration these experiments would be incomplete.
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exactly the same thought perhaps my observations will be quite different. 
There is, therefore, no difference between a person who is subjected to 
teletransportion through the complete destruction of a body on planet X, 
a reconstructed version of the person on planet Y. The fundamental question 
is if I am the same person that I was on planet X, and now I am on planet Y.
Proponents of the sufficiency of the body theory might have some 
doubts. On the one hand, it is true that both persons on planet X and on 
planet Y appear completely indistinguishable from each other and the fact 
is that anywhere in the universe there is simply no other person with the 
same cell system, with the same looks, that could be me.. On the other hand, 
can we say in that in this case we are dealing with exactly the same person? 
Is the preservation of the continuity of exactly the same substance and the 
person numerically identical? This is the problem of continuity of the body, 
that in the presented case does not occur. There is no numerical identity 
between these two persons but only qualitative identity.9 Annihilation of 
the person on planet X and their perfect copy reproduction on planet Y 
results in their loss of numerical identity and the interruption of bodily 
continuity. The person reproduced on the planet Y is just a perfect copy 
which has the same body as the person on planet X, but it is not the same 
person.10 Despite the similarities, there are already two persons, person 
from planet X no longer exists.
9 Parfit demonstrates the difference between the qualitative and numerical identity using 
the example of billiard balls. When we have two white balls one can say that they are 
identical, but only in terms of what they look like, their outer garments, because they are 
not the same balls. On the other hand, when the same white ball is repainted red , one can 
say that we have the same ball, numerically, although the quality is no longer the same. 
(Parfit 2012, 244). 
10 Bremer remarks on the possibility of existence of perfect copy: “persons and their exact 
copies (ie. the zombies) are indistinguishable in terms of external properties, which 
they are entitled. They differ only in terms of relationship to something third (eg. to the 
states subjective, to the position in time and space). Thus, the identity cannot be justified 
only as the sum of the external properties but must also have quite specific reference to 
something else. This assumes that the feature remains unchanged, no matter whether it 
is a conscious person, or the zombies. Man can change (i) or when will change the criteria 
by which it is identifiable, become useless, or the lack of criteria to determine the identity, 
(ii) when you change the existing criteria for the identification (cf. derived from Locke’s 
example of shoemaker becoming a prince).” (Bremer 2007, 30).
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Secondly, following Parfit’s extended version of this mental experiment, 
we can imagine a situation in which it would appear that the scanner while 
it is scanning me breaks down. Rather than destroying the person on planet 
X and restoring its perfect copy on planet Y, the scanner did not destroy 
a person from planet X.11 After leaving the teletransporter I decide to make 
a phone call to planet Y to talk with my perfect copy. Will it be a conversation 
with myself or rather will it be a conversation with a separate entity? Right 
now, we are in a situation where we have two persons with the same body and 
exactly the same memories, namely the existence of an extreme similarity. 
Although nothing changes the mere fact of having the same memories also 
turns out not to be enough.
 In the context of this experiment someone could say that what is suffi-
cient to maintain the continuity of identity is psychological continuity. I am 
the same person, because it is a continuity of my memory, and it means that 
I remember my past events and their restoration in a more or less similar 
body is quite sufficient. However, restoration of mental life in a different 
body can be recognized as a strange solution, but that assumption is quite 
in line with the everyday observation, because it justifies changes in the 
physical body. I am the same person as I was 25 years ago, even though my 
body looks much different, because I know my story in a way that no one 
else can know it, I have special access to my mental life.
However, we can formulate a few arguments against this position. 
Assuming that I am the same person, because there is psychological con-
tinuity between a person at the time t2 and a person at the time t1, because 
I have the same memory, so it means that when I appear on planet Y in 
a teletransporter cabin also I must be the same person that I was on planet X.
However, my body may not be numerically the same body (including 
another brain) – and even in the extended version, in normal conditions 
my body will not be the same, because we observe inscribed change in the 
nature of our bodies – psychological continuity should solve the problem 
of identity. Unfortunately, it is possible that such a solution can create 
11 Parfit also mentions this possibility.
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a so-called circularity error which was described e.g. by Grygianiec and many 
others who commented on Hume’s bundle theory. If I am the same person 
because of the memory, which appears in a new body (perfect copy), I cannot 
be identified by psychological continuity, because the same psychological 
continuity is determined by its association with a particular person whose 
psychological continuity has to be a proof of. Memory is not a collection 
of information that is necessarily assigned to a person. The person has 
some memories, because the person is experiencing certain events and 
this person is involved in them. We can imagine that memory is like a piece 
of data stored on your computer. This disc contains all of my memories, 
because I am experiencing different events and I recorded this drive, but 
I am not this drive, there is no reduction of me into this drive. Secondly, 
there is a close relationship between memory and the computer. When we 
look at this particular computer, we are able to predict what information 
it has. And now, if the disc was recorded on a computer X, then installing 
it on computer Y does not make the computer Y computer X due to the 
disc with a specific content (in relation to the possibility of restoration of 
memory in the other object/body). Here, the objection of circularity which 
criticizes the concept of sufficiency of memory seems to be well-grounded.12
At this point, we can imagine another experiment, (in two versions), 
which will have the task to bring us to answer the question whether the 
criterion of personal identity can be the human brain and whether the con-
tinuity of memory and holding the same brain can be treated as a sufficient 
and necessary criteria.
(1) In a moment, an operation of transplantation of the brain from 
the body of one person A to the body of another person B will take place, 
which in advance has been deprived of original brain.13 The operation was 
12 I note at this point, that later on I will refer to Swinburne, and personal identity, that will 
appeal to the existence of the soul, the very existence of the soul and its functions cannot 
be reduced to being the subject of memory. Then, it seems, the objection is easily able to 
cope with the rejection of the possibility of the existence of the soul.
13 Garret refers to that experiment and he admits that the person who introduced it to a public 
debate was S. Shoemaker. In the original version of that experiment, one person is called 
Mr. Robinson and the other Mr. Brown. The created person is Mr. Brownson. (Garret 1998, 45).
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successful. We managed to transplant brain from the body of person A to 
the body of person B. Typical possible solutions of that experiment can be 
presented in the following responses:
1a person A has survived
2a person B has survived
The question that should also be posed, which is the inverse of the first 
person who died?
1b Person A
2b Person B
Proponents of the opportunities 1a and 2b refer to the assumption 
that the identity of person relies on the identity or continuity of memory 
based on the identity of the brain. It cannot be ruled out that compared to 
the option with teletransportation from planet X to planet Y, the case of 
preserving the brain, as an important aspect of the human body ensures 
a certain continuity of the previous person. Assuming further argument, 
that the brain is the only sufficient organ, which is responsible for the 
preservation of memory, character and memories, we need to admit that 
this person still exists.
There are known examples of people who, for different reasons, require 
operation to remove some parts of the brain, e.g. from a few to several 
percent. Making dependent personal identity in the strong sense on the 
survival of the brain as a whole we would have to agree to a situation in 
which a person would lose some part of the brain, even a few percent of it 
to lose either part of the memory, and along with that part of the identity. 
However, if we accept the presented experiment that a person’s identity 
that derived from the survival of the brain and memory is the same, we 
should agree that in case of death of the person, if only functions of the 
brain are maintained, a person can survive their own death. It turns out, 
that this seems just as absurd.14 More than this, in order to be consistent, 
14 At this point, I am trying to say that in some option, when we accept that the most impor-
tant part of person/human body is brain and we can reduce person/human being to that 
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if the person as a result of brain damage was deprived of half of their brain 
would they be only half a person, as before the damage? Also, during the 
transfer of the brain from one head to another, one would say that it is not 
a transmitted person A’s brain, but we should to say that it is a transmitted 
person A, who, in fact, is reduced to a brain.15
The experiment concerning brain transplantation is further complicated 
when we consider its extended version. (2) We can imagine that in the same 
operating room another surgery is performed – split brain operation and 
in the next step transplanting one hemisphere of the brain of person A to 
the body of person B and the other hemisphere of the brain of person A to 
person C’s body. Standard solutions16 of this experiment can be presented 
in three options:
1 Person A has survived as a person B
2 Person A has survived as a person C
3 Person A has survived as a person B and person C
This experiment can be further complicated by asking the fundamental 
question, whether person A died, when the brain was deprived of person 
A’s body or person A has survived operation because of the continuity of 
memory / brain or the brain and memory? If we accept that the operation 
was successful and the person A is still alive so now which person A is it? 
If person A has survived due to the survival of the left hemisphere as such 
person B, why has not survive as the person C? If, however, person A has 
survived due to the transfer of the right hemisphere as the person C, why 
have they not survived as a person B? In this situation, we are faced with 
trying to respond to a relatively absurd question. But it seems more reason-
part we can suppose that maintaining that part of brain will be equal to surviving death 
(frankly speaking it is very difficult even to say that death would be possible). Of course, 
this statement is problematic because it is, above all, against common sense. The next 
step after accepting that suggestion should be the redefinition of death.
15 As we can see, this possibility raises a lot of difficulties such as those relating to the lan-
guage. If, however, we want to consistently maintain that a person is reduced to the brain, 
so, we should say that in the body is a person-brain, and not that the person is a whole, 
along with his body.
16 Proposed by Parfit.
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able to assume that if the operation was successful, person A has survived 
as a person B and person C, which continue their mental life. And then:
The head of person B is person A,
The head of person C is person A,
but the head of person B is not the same head as the head of person C.17
And therefore person A could not survive neither does person B nor 
person C (see Grygianiec 2007, 126).
In this situation, we come back to the basic question, whether person 
A has died? If yes, then in spite of the successful transfer of the two hem-
ispheres to two different bodies, person B and person C are not the same 
person, despite the psychological continuity. Person A has not survive the 
operation. If we assume, however, that person A has survived operation, 
because the operation was successful, we should start looking for the right 
answer from the beginning (Grygianiec 2007, 126).
In the proposed solutions we tried to answer the question concerning 
personal identity from the perspective of psychological or bodily continuity 
– person O1 in moment t1 is the same person as O2 in moment t2 because 
of psychological or bodily continuity. However, there is also the possibility 
that the criterion of personal identity necessarily and sufficiently depends 
on at least two criteria, e.g. the continuity of the body and the psychological 
continuity. And so it happens because of the separate insufficiency of two 
of those different criteria. S. Shoemaker who is aware of the difficulties 
generated only by accepting psychological continuity agrees that “regardless 
of whether the memory is a necessary and sufficient criterion for personal 
identity, or is not, it does not constitute, as it turns out, the only criterion. 
[...] The memory could not be the only criterion that we use saying about 
17 Lynn Ruder Baker proposes her solution, which she calls not-so-simple Simple View: 
“There are not just two possible answers, but three possible answers to the question: 
which is the original person? The answers are either Lefty, Righty or neither, and the 
not-so-simple Simple View is compatible with all three answers. We do not know which 
is the correct answer, but the not-so-simple Simple View implies that there is a fact of 
the matter that depends on whether Lefty or Righty or neither has the original person’s 
first-person perspective.” (Baker 2012, 184–185). In this article I will refer to Baker’s con-
ception, only when it is necessary
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other persons.” (Shoemaker 2001, 200). If anyone remembers any past 
event it is because that person was a witness to this event, when it occurred 
(Shoemaker 2001, 201). And being a witness of an event means that someone 
was present there also in the body. “At least in certain circumstances, the 
identity of the body must be a criterion of personal identity.” (Shoemaker 
2001, 204) In addition, in determining whether a person is really present 
when some event takes place, or if we wish to verify if that person tells the 
truth, “we cannot use memory as our criterion of personal identity, and it 
is hard to see something else which we could use in this respect apart from 
the identity of the body.” (Shoemaker 2001, 204–205).18
The proposed solutions are not the only ones where we try to cope 
with the problem of personal identity. On the one hand, continuity of the 
body, on the other, the psychological continuity or two of these criteria 
taken together reduce the identity to facts of another kind. John Robinson 
says that last decision in the case of preservation of identity has quaint, 
additional facts, which is responsible for the fact that I am this and not 
another person.19 (Robinson 2001, 215) Psychological continuity and bodily 
continuity, considered as relevant by Shoemaker or Ayer are inadequate, 
according to Robinson, for the preservation of personal identity (Robinson 
2001, 215). That additional fact, as it is called by Robinson, may be the 
answer to the question of the criterion of personal identity. This is not the 
continuity of the body or psychological continuity determining the type of 
response to the question of personal identity, and this quaint additional 
fact (Robinson 2001, 215).
Similar concepts can be found in the texts of Swinburne who openly 
states that this what other philosophers, proponents of complex view 
theories, treat as personal identity criteria, denotes bodily continuity or 
psychological continuity (things that are observable) which Swinburne 
18 This view is shared by Ayer, who adds that in the case of synchronous identity we could 
also think about support of this criterion.
19 Of course, the mere fact that the cells of my perfect copies will only be perfectly similar to 
me, but will not be numerically the same cells – and this is seems to be justified – which 
makes me numerically the same person.
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treats only as a certificate of personal identity (Swinburne 2001, 341–342). 
Personal identity depends on another fact which has no relation to the 
empirical conditions – substantial soul. Soul is a different thing than body 
as it is in substantial Cartesian thought and cannot be proceeded in further 
explanation and analysis. Identity is something original and irreducible 
(Swinburne 2001, 338), as it was also presented by Butler in his work 
Of Personal Identity.
Agreeing that the principle of personal identity is soul also solves very 
important issues with the possibility of the resurrection. While we are 
convinced that the human body is decomposed after death and the same 
happens to brains, which store personal memory, we must accept that 
a non-material, substantial and immortal20 soul provides the possibility 
of existence of individuals after death. Swinburne underlines the funda-
mental fact concerning our ideas about resurrection. In the resurrection 
(my resurrection) it does not matter that I can rise from the dead as well 
as the person who is absolutely identical with me. What counts for me is 
only that exactly I will rise from the death. That quaint additional fact, 
soul, according to Swinburne, ensures that we can survive our death. The 
adoption of the existence of the soul also meets the requirement mentioned 
by Locke (Locke 1964, 155–163; Locke 1955, t. 1) that if I exist after death, 
that there must be still one and the same substance, which will have no 
two origins in time21. The survival of me demands continuity once being 
launched / the substance.22
Although we can find many advantages of accepting soul as a criterion 
of personal identity, we also should mention a number of arguments against 
that crucial for that article solution. First of all, the concept of the soul has 
20 I distinguish between immortality of the soul and indestructibility. However, this assump-
tion will not be further explained because of its deep base of a religious nature that could 
require another article, written from a philosophical point of view.
21 For example, a person in the example with teletransportation has two beginnings in time. 
The moment when the person on planet Y has their own beginning in time is the moment 
when the person on planet X is annihilated.
22 Similarly, Th. Nagel observes that in the discussion on personal identity we have to 
choose between the material brain and immaterial self. The transformation of the self as 
separate from the body or a substance may give us life after death. (See Nagel, 1995, 168).
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no overall merit of explaining in modern science. (Grygianiec 2007, 127) 
Science does not examine the soul, because firstly, science should prove that 
the soul exists according to its own methods. So far we have not discovered 
any proof that could be generally accepted as a valid one to the existence 
of soul. Secondly, the exact meaning of the soul is not known, which could 
be analyzed and, in fact, the concept of the soul explains nothing, because, 
in the familiar understanding, we can replace it with other empirically 
verifiable concepts. (Grygianiec 2007, 127)
While the first argument can be regarded as important and valid, be-
cause actually science does not deal with the concept of soul, nor with soul 
transplantations, the second argument can be avoided for several reasons. 
While it is true that some mystics such as St. John of the Cross or St. Teresa 
of Ávila explained the functioning of the memory of the person through the 
concept of the soul, modern science attempts to determine the exact place 
of memory in the brain. Unfortunately, however, it has been unknown until 
now. Secondly, there are cases of people who undergo a surgery of removing 
parts of the brain, which does not result in a loss of similar part of the 
memory.23 But still, we can adopt the proposition that the soul is somehow 
related to the brain and the soul is essentially the principle of personal 
identity.24 It can be proven that there is no satisfactory criterion of personal 
identity as a result of the reduction of identity to body or psychological 
continuity – so apart from the pragmatic side using an identity term, soul, 
as this part assigned to the person (as Thomas Aquinas did) can be as well 
the principle and individuation responsible for the characteristics of the 
species. In addition, the soul understood in such a way would be entelechy of 
the body, thus animating and organizing the functioning of a living human 
23 Removing 5% of our brain does not mean that we are removing 5% of memory. However, 
possible problems with memory are explained by other medial theories and this does not 
always mean that the main reason is in removing of physical organ. On the other hand, 
losing memory does not always mean that someone has lost physical brain. Also, modern 
science is willing to say that memory depends on using all the neurons rather than a spe-
cific part – especially physical memory.
24 The explanation of the relationship between soul, brain, and body of a person goes in 
a similar manner to explain the dependence of consciousness on the brain – the exact 
theory that could successfully explain this relationship is still unknown.
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being.25 It is particularly important that the soul can be treated as a source 
of the first-person perspective. While neuroscience tries to point out the 
importance of the brain in the construction of consciousness, the soul is 
the ability of the body to adopt the first-person perspective.
However, to some degree, we can accept that the adoption of the soul, 
which would be only something that explains the identity, generates more 
difficulties than benefits in solving the problem. The key difficulty concerns 
the access and the ontological status of the soul. At the moment, it is rather 
something that is being postulated rather than a fact, which would have 
access and its status is defined especially in a negative way. But in spite of 
this, its existence can be established because of the list of benefits resulting 
from the use of it. At this point, it is necessary to note that the soul would 
be understood as a matter of substance, which is in a close relation with our 
body and is the foundation of our existence – soul is something necessary. 
The body, however, the way it is organized, external features would be only 
a contingent fact in relation to the soul.
3. Towards settlement
Searching for answers to the criterion of necessary and sufficient personal 
identity, we encounter many obstacles. None of the known theory appears 
to be sufficiently satisfactory. Strictly speaking, the objects of the real world 
are subjects of change, and do not keep identity in time in a strong sense. 
Replacing parts of the molecules in the human body violates the logical 
principle of identity of the same with itself. On the other hand, we call the 
same objects identical, despite the changes that we observe in persons. 
We use the same name to address if not only for pragmatic reasons, but 
also because something in them must be the same in time. Otherwise, in 
the world in which there are permanent changes, we should question the 
existence of time and changes over time (Grygianiec 2007, 283).
25 It is possible to understand the soul as life giving breath called entelechy, the term which 
we can find in the Bible.
5(2)/2017122
RA F A Ł T RY Ś C I E Ń
At this point we can raise the decisive question, which theory deserves 
to be called the most accurate. Should we accept any of the concepts that 
reduce personal identity to the facts of a different kind (as Shoemaker or 
Ayer do) or should we state that personal identity is something original, 
irreducible and reject any attempts of talking about personal identity, as 
Butler and Ried do and Robinson and Swinburne continue (also in a dualistic 
version where soul is treated as a principle of personal identity)?
Following Dennett (Dennett 2015, 124–125) it can be said that reducing 
personal characteristics only to the brain is insufficient. When it comes to 
the example of memory, it turns out that any loss of part of the brain does 
not result in the loss of part of memory, it is not known accurately where 
memory is located. It would be more appropriate in this case, to explain that 
memory is the ability to keep our nervous system information in the form of 
memory traces called engrams (this theory comes from Zielinski.) He claims 
that an engram is “a permanent change in the nervous system caused by 
the temporary agitation and read as a representation of certain sensations, 
experiences, elements of internal and external environment”(Vetulani 
2011, 183–186). 
Furthermore, a lot originates from considering the concept of personal 
identity in the light of the possibility of resurrection26. If we want to build 
the concept of criteria for personal identity, which will be broad enough, 
it must take into account the proposition of a possible resurrection and, 
indeed, we must look for a factor that survives death (depending also on 
how death itself is understood).27 Locke’s idea is very important if we talk 
26 At this point, my intention is to underline a very important aspect that if we reflect on 
the concept of resurrection we should decide what kind of resurrection we have in mind 
taking into consideration religion or philosophy. I will try to reflect on the conception 
according to its essence, namely a Christian conception. I maintain that the concept of 
resurrection is about the possibility of resurrection and action of God, who can restore 
person to life.
27 I maintain that the criteria of personal identity can be divided into two groups, apart from 
a typical division into the Complex View and Simple View, we can also talk about the cri-
teria in time and criteria beyond time. The first group of criteria will address the issues of 
being the same person in the real world until death. The second group of criteria is about 
being the same in the real world and the possibility of resurrection. In case of the second 
group we need a criterion of personal identity, which will take into account such facts as 
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about the substance identity – not only as quality, but above all as numeric. 
Parfit observes, that substance cannot have two origins in time. It seems, 
therefore, that the most appropriate solution is a perspective of Robinson, 
Swinburne or Butler. There is some additional fact (the soul) and physical 
criteria of personal identity are only the evidence of personal identity. 
Following this path we provide a numerical identity (always the same 
substance) with qualitative identity (numerically the same substance is able 
to reproduce the object – the body – with the same characteristics as before 
its death – for example, because possessing strictly the same information).
However, it is undisputable that if we all agree that life after death 
exists, in accordance with the principle of better to exist than not to exist 
because it pays off to believe in it and for rational people life after death 
should be a life goal. For this, we require a method to survive death, we need 
some type of media. It appears that the media, perhaps unfortunately for 
the history of this concept is called the soul. On the other hand, what is the 
major objection is the ontological status of the soul, we cannot imagine or 
describe anything about the existence of soul that can be proven by science. 
In fact, we do not have any access, which is based on scientific evidence or 
scientifically proven, to the confirmation that the soul exists.
Finally, we can imagine a case in which a person A suffers from a serious 
accident. The person goes to hospital and it turns out that the accident 
was so severe that the person irretrievably lost all their memory. What is 
more, this person lost all their acquired abilities (due to the sustained brain 
injury), such as speech, walking, etc., and recovers after about one year of 
rehabilitation. All the efforts of the family to help this person regain their 
former identity seem futile. Showing photos does not help. The fact that the 
person sees a picture of someone who has their body does not mean that 
person A feels any connection with that person. What this person has is 
the destruction of the physical body, the possibility of memory loss with the destruction 
of the brain (only if it is in 100% proven that memory depends only on the brain) and the 
possibility of resurrection. Secondly, nowadays, people who are trying to push through 
a dualistic or simplistic concepts or usually assume that previously there was the possi-
bility of resurrection. Adding the possibility of survival after death, somewhat inevitably 
imposes the necessity of the existence of a factor that will resist death.
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only their first-person reference to themselves, which determines that the 
person feels who they are. Bodily continuity was saved but psychological 
continuity was irretrievably destructed as a result of the accident. Instead 
of continuing existence, we meet a new person, with old body, as we can 
agree. That situation is similar to the problem of teletransportion. What 
does not allow us to accept that in case of teletransporter corruption we 
deal with one and the same person is a particular fact in case of the person 
from planet X and the person from planet Y who will think that they are 
not the other person. The person from planet X and the person from planet 
Y will be convinced they are themselves. They can say that they have the 
same memories, the same body, but the reference to themselves will be 
of a special kind. Their own copy will not be treated as a duplicate, but as 
a second, completely different person. Exactly the same solution should 
be adopted for the allocation and transplant hemispheres to two different 
bodies. Person B and Person C will not be the same person. For those who 
question the operations of who they are, one and the other will respond 
first of all, it is you, and may have similar memories of similar experiences, 
even similar body. They will not say, however, that a person B is a person C 
or person C will not say they are the person B.
In this article, I tried to more or less accurately present a concept of 
personal identity. This concept takes into consideration the disadvantages 
that result from relying only on metaphysical criteria, particularly with 
regard to such factors as the continuity of the body or psychological con-
tinuity. In the case of the proposal, which says that the continuity of the 
body and the psychological continuity are the two criteria that support 
each other, the concept presented in this article acknowledges them, but 
does not treat them as criteria. Following the view of Swinburne, they are 
regarded as a testimony of personal identity. The essence of personal identity 
comes down to the soul. On the other hand, the soul is primarily the ability 
of a person to gain the first-person perspective. The concept, which was 
presented at this point is trying to unify three modern positions – view 
complex, simple view and not-so-simple simple view. 
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Nevertheless, proposed solution cannot be treated as a wonderful new 
theory that will solve all problems. Also, it is not as original as we could 
expect. Apart from all difficulties, proposed solutions should be under 
further investigation. First of all, we have to concentrate more on solving the 
ontological status of the soul (sometimes it seems impossible to complete) 
and recognize how it is possible that soul is the source of the first-person 
perspective and that this perspective is very closely related to the brain 
activity (which looks similar to the body-mind problem). 
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